Virtual private network (VPN)-aware customer premises equipment (CPE) edge router

ABSTRACT

A network architecture includes a communication network that supports one or more network-based Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). The communication network includes a plurality of boundary routers that are connected by access links to CPE edge routers belonging to the one or more VPNs. To prevent traffic from outside a customer&#39;s VPN (e.g., traffic from other VPNs or the Internet at large) from degrading the QoS provided to traffic from within the customer&#39;s VPN, the present invention gives precedence to intra-VPN traffic over extra-VPN traffic on each customer&#39;s access link through access link prioritization or access link capacity allocation, such that extra-VPN traffic cannot interfere with inter-VPN traffic. Granting precedence to intra-VPN traffic over extra-VPN traffic in this manner entails partitioning between intra-VPN and extra-VPN traffic on the physical access link using layer 2 multiplexing and configuration of routing protocols to achieve logical traffic separation between intra-VPN traffic and extra-VPN traffic at the VPN boundary routers and CPE edge routers. By configuring the access networks, the VPN boundary routers and CPE edge routers, and the routing protocols of the edge and boundary routers in this manner, the high-level service of DoS attack prevention is achieved.

This application is a continuation of the U.S. patent application havinga Ser. No. 10/023,331, filed Dec. 17, 2001 now U.S. Pat. No. 6,778,498,which claims priority under 35 U.S.C. §119(e) based on U.S. ProvisionalPatent Application Ser. No. 60/276,923, filed Mar. 20, 2001, U.S.Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 60/276,953, filed Mar. 20, 2001,U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 60/276,954, filed Mar. 20,2001, and U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 60/276,955 filedMar. 20, 2001.

The present application is related to the following co-pendingapplications, which are assigned to the assignee of the presentinvention, filed on even date herewith, and incorporated herein byreference in their entireties:

-   -   (1) U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/023,043, entitled        “SYSTEM, METHOD AND APPARATUS THAT EMPLOY VIRTUAL PRIVATE        NETWORKS TO RESIST IP QoS DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS;” and    -   (2) U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/023,332, now abandoned,        entitled “SYSTEM, METHOD AND APPARATUS THAT ISOLATE VIRTUAL        PRIVATE NETWORK (VPN) AND BEST EFFORT TRAFFIC TO RESIST DENIAL        OF SERVICE ATTACKS.”

The following publications available through the Internet EngineeringTask Force (IETF) are also incorporated by reference in their entiretiesas background information:

-   -   (1) Branden, R., Clark D. and S. Shenker, “Integrated Services        in the Internet Architecture: an Overview,” IETF, RFC 1633, June        1994;

(2) Branden, R., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S. and S. Jamin,“Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP)—Version 1 FunctionalSpecification,” IETF, RFC 2205, September 1997;

-   -   (3) Blake, S., Black, D. Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z.        and W. Weiss, “An Architecture for Differentiated Services,”        IETF, RFC 2475, December 1998;    -   (4) Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, “BGP/MPLS VPNs,” IETF, RFC 2547,        March 1999;    -   (5) Gleeson, B., Lin., A., Heinanen, J., Finland, T.,        Armitage, G. and A. Malis, “A Framework for IP Based Virtual        Private Networks,” IETF, RFC 2764, February 2000;    -   (6) Muthukrishnan, K. and A. Malis, “A Core MPLS IP VPN        Architecture,” IETF, RFC 2917, September 2000; and

(7) Bernet, Y., Ford, P., Yavatkar, R., Baker, F., Zhang, L., Speer, M.,Braden, R., Davie, B., Wroclawski, J. and E. Felstaine, “A Framework forIntegrated Services Operation over Diffserv Networks,” IETF, RFC 2998,November 2000.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Technical Field

The present invention relates to communication networks and, inparticular, to the prevention of denial of service attacks in a publiccommunication network, for example, the Internet. Still moreparticularly, the present invention relates to method, system andapparatus for preventing denial of service attacks in a communicationnetwork having a shared network infrastructure by separating theallocation and/or prioritization of access capacity to traffic of siteswithin a virtual private network (VPN) from the allocation and/orprioritization of access capacity to sites in another VPN or the publicnetwork.

2. Description of the Related Art

For network service providers, a key consideration in network design andmanagement is the appropriate allocation of access capacity and networkresources between traffic originating from VPN customer sites andtraffic originating from outside the VPN (e.g., from the Internet orother VPNs). This consideration is particularly significant with respectto the traffic of VPN customers whose subscription includes a ServiceLevel Agreement (SLA) requiring the network service provider to providea minimum communication bandwidth or to guarantee a particular Qualityof Service (QoS). Such service offerings require the network serviceprovider to implement a network architecture and protocol that achieve aspecified QoS and ensure sufficient access capacity and networkresources are available for communication with other VPN sites separatefrom communication with hosts that are not part of the VPN.

In Internet Protocol (IP) networks, a straightforward approach toachieving QoS and implementing admission control comparable to that ofconnection-oriented network services, such as voice or AsynchronousTransfer Mode (ATM), is to emulate the same hop-by-hop switchingparadigm of signaling resource reservations for the flow of IP packetsrequiring QoS. In fact, the IP signaling standard developed by theInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF) for Integrated Services (Intserv)adopts precisely this approach. As described in IETF RFC 1633, Intservis a per-flow IP QoS architecture that enables applications to chooseamong multiple, controlled levels of delivery service for their datapackets. To support this capability, Intserv permits an application at atransmitter of a packet flow to use the well-known Resource ReSerVationProtocol (RSVP) defined by IETF RFC 2205 to request a desired QoS classat a specific level of capacity from all network elements along the pathto a receiver of the packet flow. After receiving an RSVP PATH messagerequesting a resource reservation and an RSVP RESV message confirmingresource reservation from an upstream node, individual network elementsalong the path implement mechanisms to control the QoS and capacitydelivered to packets within the flow.

FIG. 1 illustrates the implications of utilizing a conventional Intservimplementation to perform admission control. As shown in FIG. 1, anexemplary IP network 10 includes N identical nodes (e.g., serviceprovider boundary routers) 12, each having L links of capacity X coupledto Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) 14 for L distinct customers. In aper-flow, connection-oriented approach, each node 12 ensures that nolink along a network path from source to destination is overloaded.Looking at access capacity, a per-flow approach is able tostraightforwardly limit the input flows on each of the ingress accesslinks such that the sum of the capacity for all flows does not exceedthe capacity X of any egress access link (e.g., Link 1 of node 12 a). Asimilar approach is applicable to links connecting unillustrated corerouters within IP network 10.

Although conceptually very simple, the admission control techniqueillustrated in FIG. 1 has a number of drawbacks. Most importantly,Intserv admission control utilizing RSVP has limited scalability becauseof the processing-intensive signaling RSVP requires in the serviceprovider's boundary and core routers. In particular, RSVP requiresend-to-end signaling to request appropriate resource allocation at eachnetwork element between the transmitter and receiver, policy queries byingress node 12 b-12 d to determine which flows to admit and policetheir traffic accordingly, as well as numerous other handshake messages.Consequently, the processing required by Intserv RSVP signaling iscomparable to that of telephone or ATM signaling and requires a highperformance (i.e., expensive) processor component within each boundaryor core IP router to handle the extensive processing required by suchsignaling. RSVP signaling is soft state, which means the signalingprocess is frequently refreshed (by default once every 30 seconds) sincethe forwarding path across the IP network may change and thereforeinformation about the QoS and capacity requested by a flow must becommunicated periodically. This so-called soft-state mode of operationcreates an additional processing load on a router even greater than thatof an ATM switch. Furthermore, if the processor of a boundary router isoverloaded by a large number of invalid RSVP requests, the processor maycrash, thereby disrupting service for all flows for all customers beinghandled by the router with the failing processor.

In recognition of the problems associated with implementing admissioncontrol utilizing conventional Intserv RSVP signaling, the IETFpromulgated the Differentiated Services (Diffserv or DS) protocoldefined in RFC 2475. Diffserv is an IP QoS architecture that achievesscalability by conveying an aggregate traffic classification within a DSfield (e.g., the IPv4 Type of Service (TOS) byte or IPv6 traffic classbyte) of each IP-layer packet header. The first six bits of the DS fieldencode a Diffserv Code Point (DSCP) that requests a specific class ofservice or Per Hop Behavior (PHB) for the packet at each node along itspath within a Diffserv domain.

In a Diffserv domain, network resources are allocated to aggregates ofpacket flows in accordance with service provisioning policies, whichgovern DSCP marking and traffic conditioning upon entry to the Diffservdomain and traffic forwarding within the Diffserv domain. The marking(i.e., classification) and conditioning operations need be implementedonly at Diffserv network boundaries. Thus, rather than requiringend-to-end signaling between the transmitter and receiver to establish aflow having a specified QoS, Diffserv enables an ingress boundary routerto provide the QoS to aggregated flows simply by examining and/ormarking each IP packet's header.

Although the Diffserv standard addresses Intserv scalability limitationby replacing Intserv's processing-intensive signaling with a simple perpacket marking operation that can easily be performed in hardware,implementation of the Diffserv protocol presents a different type ofproblem. In particular, because Diffserv allows host marking of theservice class, a Diffserv network customer link can experience a Denialof Service (DoS) attack if a number of hosts send packets to that linkwith the DS field set to a high priority. It should be noted that a setof hosts can exceed the subscribed capacity of a Diffserv service classdirectly by setting the DSCP or indirectly by submitting traffic that isclassified by some other router or device to a particular DSCP. InDiffserv, an IP network can only protect its resources by policing atthe ingress routers to ensure that each customer interface does notexceed the subscribed capacity for each Diffserv service class. However,this does not prevent a DoS attack.

FIG. 2 depicts a DOS attack scenario in an exemplary IP network 10′ thatimplements the conventional Diffserv protocol. In FIG. 2, a number ofingress nodes (e.g., ingress boundary routers) 12 b′-12 d′ each admittraffic targeting a single link of an egress node (e.g., egress boundaryrouter) 12 a′. Although each ingress nodes 12′ polices incoming packetsto ensure that customers do not exceed their subscribed resources ateach DSCP, the aggregate of the admitted flows exceeds the capacity X ofegress Link 1 of node 12 a′, resulting in a denial of service to thecustomer site served by this link.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

In view of the limitations attendant to conventional implementations ofthe Intserv and Diffserv standards, the present invention recognizesthat it would be useful and desirable to provide a method, system andapparatus for data communication that support a communication protocolthat, unlike conventional Intserv implementations, is highly scalableand yet protects against the DoS attacks to which conventional Diffservand other networks are susceptible.

A network architecture in accordance with the present invention includesa communication network that supports one or more network-based VirtualPrivate Networks (VPNs). The communication network includes a pluralityof boundary routers that are connected by access links to CPE edgerouters belonging to the one or more VPNs. To prevent traffic fromoutside a customer's VPN (e.g., traffic from other VPNs or the Internetat large) from degrading the QoS provided to traffic from within thecustomer's VPN, the present invention gives precedence to intra-VPNtraffic over extra-VPN traffic on each customer's access link throughaccess link prioritization or access link capacity allocation, such thatextra-VPN traffic cannot interfere with inter-VPN traffic. Grantingprecedence to intra-VPN traffic over extra-VPN traffic in this mannerentails special configuration of network elements and protocols,including partitioning between intra-VPN and extra-VPN traffic on thephysical access link and access network using layer 2 switching andmultiplexing, as well as the configuration of routing protocols toachieve logical traffic separation between intra-VPN traffic andextra-VPN traffic at the VPN boundary routers and CPE edge routers. Byconfiguring the access networks, the VPN boundary routers and CPE edgerouters, and the routing protocols of the edge and boundary routers inthis manner, the high-level service of DoS attack prevention isachieved.

Additional objects, features, and advantages of the present inventionwill become apparent from the following detailed written description.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The novel features believed characteristic of the invention are setforth in the appended claims. The invention itself however, as well as apreferred mode of use, further objects and advantages thereof, will bestbe understood by reference to the following detailed description of anillustrative embodiment when read in conjunction with the accompanyingdrawings, wherein:

FIG. 1 depicts a conventional Integrated Services (Intserv) network thatimplements per-flow QoS utilizing RSVP;

FIG. 2 illustrates a conventional Differentiated Services (Diffserv)network that implements QoS on aggregated traffic flows utilizing DSCPmarkings in each packet header and is therefore vulnerable to a Denialof Service (DoS) attack;

FIG. 3 depicts an exemplary communication network that, in accordancewith a preferred embodiment of the present invention, resists DoSattacks by partitioning allocation and/or prioritization of accesscapacity by reference to membership in Virtual Private Networks (VPNs);

FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary network architecture that provides aCPE-based VPN solution to the DoS attack problem;

FIG. 5 is a more detailed block diagram of a QoS-aware CPE edge routerthat may be utilized within the network architectures depicted in FIGS.4 and 7;

FIG. 6A is a more detailed block diagram of a QoS-aware boundary routerwithout VPN function that may be utilized within the networkarchitectures illustrated in FIGS. 4 and 7;

FIG. 6B is a more detailed block diagram of a QoS-aware boundary routerhaving VPN function that may be utilized within the network architectureillustrated in FIG. 4;

FIG. 7 illustrates an exemplary network architecture that provides anetwork-based VPN solution to the DoS attack problem; and

FIG. 8 is a more detailed block diagram of a QoS-aware VPN boundaryrouter that may be utilized within the network architecture depicted inFIG. 7.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF A PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

With reference again to the figures and, in particular, with referenceto FIG. 3, there is depicted a high level block diagram of an exemplarynetwork architecture 20 that, in accordance with the present invention,provides a scalable method of providing QoS to selected traffic whileprotecting a Virtual Private Network (VPN) customer's access and trunknetwork links against DoS attacks. Similar to the prior art networkillustrated in FIG. 2, network architecture 20 of FIG. 3 includes aDiffserv network 21 having N service provider boundary routers (BRs) 22that each have L access links. What is different in network architecture20 is that Diffserv network 21 supports a plurality of VPN instances, ofwhich two are shown in the figure as identified by the access links ofboundary routers 22 coupled to CPE edge routers (ERs) for a firstnetwork service customer 24 and an ER for a second network servicecustomer 25 at each of four sites, respectively identified by letters athrough d. Each CPE ER provides network service to a customer's localarea networks (LANs). The service provider network-based VPN may supportmany more customers than the two shown in this figure.

In the exemplary communication scenario depicted in FIG. 3, hosts withinthe LANs of the first VPN customer coupled to CPE edge routers 24 b-24d, those within a second VPN customer's LANs coupled to CPE edge routers25 a-25 d, as well as sites coupled to other unillustrated CPE edgerouters linked to boundary routers 22 a-22 d, may all transmit packetflows targeting the LAN coupled to the first VPN customer CPE edgerouter 24 a. If the conventional Diffserv network of the prior artdescribed above with respect to FIG. 2 were implemented, the outgoingaccess link 1 of boundary router 22 a coupled to CPE edge router 24 acould be easily overwhelmed by the convergence of these flows, resultingin a DoS. However, in accordance with the present invention, Diffservnetwork 21 of FIG. 3 prevents a DoS attack from sites outside the VPN bydirecting intra-VPN traffic to a first logical port 27 on physicalaccess link 1 of boundary router 22 a, while directing traffic fromother VPNs or other sites to a second logical port 28 on physical accesslink 1 of boundary router 22 a.

To prevent traffic from outside a customer's community of interest(e.g., traffic from other VPNs or the Internet at large) from degradingthe QoS provided to traffic from within the customer's community ofinterest (e.g., traffic from other hosts in the same businessenterprise), the present invention either prioritizes intra-VPN trafficover extra-VPN traffic, or allocates access link capacity such thatextra-VPN traffic cannot interfere with inter-VPN traffic. In otherwords, as described in detail below, each boundary router 22 givesprecedence on each customer's access link to traffic originating withinthe customer's VPN, where a VPN is defined herein as a collection ofnodes coupled by a shared network infrastructure in which networkresources and/or communications are partitioned based upon membership ofa collection of nodes. Granting precedence to intra-VPN traffic overextra-VPN traffic in this manner entails special configuration ofnetwork elements and protocols, including partitioning of the physicalaccess between intra-VPN and extra-VPN traffic using layer 2multiplexing and the configuration of routing protocols to achievelogical traffic separation. In summary, the configuration of the CPEedge router, the access network, the network-based VPN boundary routerand the routing protocols involved in the edge and boundary routerscooperate to achieve the high-level service of DoS attack prevention, asdetailed below. Conventional Diffserv and CPE edger router IPsec-basedIP VPN implementations, by contrast, do not segregate traffic destinedfor sites within the same VPN (i.e., intra-VPN traffic) and traffic sentfrom other regions of the Internet (i.e., extra-VPN traffic).

Referring now to FIGS. 4-8, at least two classes of implementations ofthe generalized network architecture 20 depicted in FIG. 3 are possible.In particular, a network in accordance with the present invention can berealized as a CPE-based VPN implementation, as described below withreference to FIGS. 4-6, or as a network-based VPN implementation, asdescribed below with reference to FIGS. 7-8.

Referring first to FIG. 4, there is illustrated an exemplary networkarchitecture 30 that employs a CPE-based VPN to resist DoS attacks. Thedepicted network architecture includes a Diffserv-enabled IP VPN network44, a best effort IP public network 46, and a plurality of customerLocal Area Networks (LANs) 32. Customer LANs 32 each include one or morehosts 48 that can function as a transmitter and/or receiver of packetscommunicated over one or both of networks 44 and 46. In the exemplaryimplementation illustrated in FIG. 4, it is assumed that customer LANs32 a and 32 b belong to the same community of interest (i.e., VPN), suchas a business enterprise.

Each customer LAN 32 is coupled by a respective CPE edge router 34 andphysical access link 35 to a respective access network (e.g., an L2access network) 38. Access networks 38 a and 38 b each have a first L2access logical connection to a boundary router (BR) 40 ofDiffserv-enabled IP VPN network 44 and a second L2 access logicalconnection to a boundary router (BR) 42 of best effort IP public network46. As illustrated in FIG. 4 by differing line styles representingintra-VPN and extra-VPN traffic, VPN-aware CPE edge routers 34 a and 34b route only packets with IP address prefixes belonging to the IP VPNvia Diffserv-enabled IP VPN network 44, and route all other traffic viabest effort IP public network 46. To enhance security of customer LANs32, CPE edge routers 34 a and 34 b send all traffic to and from besteffort IP public network 46 through a respective one of firewalls 36 aand 36 b.

In the network architecture illustrated in FIG. 4, DoS attacksoriginating outside of the IP VPN are prevented by configuration ofboundary routers 40 a-40 b and 42 a-42 b to appropriately utilize thetwo logical connections of access networks 38 a and 38 b to grantprecedence to intra-VPN traffic. For example, in a first configuration,a higher priority is assigned to the L2 access logical connection withDiffserv-enabled IP VPN network 44 than to the L2 access logicalconnection with best effort public IP network 46. L2 access networksthat support such prioritization of access links 35 include Ethernet(e.g., utilizing Ethernet priority), ATM (e.g., utilizing ATM servicecategories), and many frame relay (FR) network implementations. Theseimplementations can each be provisioned utilizing well-known techniques.With this configuration, each boundary router 40 of Diffserv enabled IPVPN network 44 shapes the transmission rate of packets to its logicalconnection to access network 38 to a value less than that of the accesslink to prevent starvation of the L2 access logical connection to besteffort IP public network 46. Alternatively, in a second configuration,boundary routers 40 a-40 b and 42 a-42 b may be individually configuredto shape the traffic destined for each L2 access network logicalconnection to a specified rate, where the sum of these rates is lessthan or equal to the transmission capacity of the physical access mediumlinking CPE edge routers 34 and access networks 38. In either of thesealternative configurations, boundary routers 40 and 42 performscheduling and prioritization based upon packets' DSCP markings andshape to the capacity allocated to the access network connection for IPVPN traffic.

As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, selection of whichof the alternative configurations to implement is a matter of designchoice, as each configuration has both advantages and disadvantages. Forexample, with the first configuration, coordination of the accessnetwork configuration between networks 44 and 46 is easier. However, ifaccess networks 38 implement only strict priority, then IP VPN trafficfrom Diffserv-enabled IP VPN network 44 may starve best effort trafficcommunicated over IP public network 46. The second configurationaddresses this disadvantage by allocating a portion of the access linkcapacity to each type of network access (i.e., both intra-VPN andextra-VPN). However, if boundary routers 40 and 42 shape traffic inaccordance with the second configuration, unused access capacity to oneof networks 44 and 46 cannot be used to access the other network. Thatis, since the shapers are on separate boundary routers 40 and 42, onlynon-work-conserving scheduling is possible.

With reference now to FIG. 5, there is illustrated a more detailed blockdiagram of a QoS-aware CPE edge router 34 that may be utilized withinthe network architecture depicted in FIG. 4. As illustrated, CPE edgerouter 34 includes a number of LAN ports 60, which provide connectionsfor a corresponding number of customer LANs 32. For example, in FIG. 5,LAN port 60 a is connected to a customer LAN 32 including a number ofhosts 48 respectively assigned 32-bit IP addresses “a.b.c.d,”“a.b.c.e.,” and “a.b.c.f.”

Each LAN port is also coupled to a forwarding function 62, whichforwards packets between LAN ports 60 and one or more logical ports(LPs) 66 residing on one or more Wide Area Network (WAN) physical ports64 (only one of which is illustrated). LPs 66, which each comprise alayer-2 sub-interface, may be implemented, for example, as an EthernetVirtual LAN (VLAN), FR Data Link Connection Identifier (DLCI), ATMVirtual Channel Connection (VCC), or Point-to-Point Protocol(PPP)/High-Level Data Link Control (HDLC) running on a Time DivisionMultiplexed (TDM) channel. WAN physical port 64 employs a scheduler 68to multiplex packets from logical ports 64 onto the transmission mediumof an access network 38 and forwards packets received from accessnetwork 38 to the respective logical port utilizing a forwardingfunction 70.

When a LAN port 60 of CPE edge router 34 receives packets from acustomer LAN 32, the packets first pass through a classifier 80, whichdetermines by reference to a classifier table 82 how each packet will behandled by CPE edge router 34. As illustrated in FIG. 5, classifiertable 82 may have a number of indices, including Source Address (SA) andDestination Address (DA), Source Port (SP) and Destination Port (DP),Protocol Type (PT), DSCP, or other fields from packets' link, network ortransport layer headers. Based upon a packet's values for one or more ofthese indices, classifier 72 obtains values for a policer (P), marker(M), destination LP, and destination LP queue (Q) within CPE edge router34 that will be utilized to process the packet. In alternativeembodiments of the present invention, lookup of the destination LP anddestination LP queue entries could be performed by forwarding function62 rather than classifier 80.

As shown, table entry values within classifier table 82 may be fullyspecified, partially specified utilizing a prefix or range, or null(indicated by “-”). For example, the SAs of hosts 48 of LAN 32 are fullyspecified utilizing 32-bit IP addresses, DAs of several destinationhosts are specified utilizing 24-bit IP address prefixes that identifyparticular IP networks, and a number of index values and one policingvalue are null. In general, the same policer, marker, and/or shapervalues, which for Intserv flows are taken from RSVP RESV messages, maybe specified for different classified packet flows. For example,classifier table 82 specifies that policer P1 and marker M1 will processpackets from any SA marked with DSCP “101” as well as packets having aSA “a.b.c.e” marked with DSCP “010.” However, classifier table 82distinguishes between flows having different classifications byspecifying different destination LP values for traffic having a DAwithin the VPN (i.e., intra-VPN traffic) and traffic addressed to hostselsewhere in the Internet (i.e., extra-VPN traffic). Thus, because IPaddress prefixes “r.s.t,” “w.x.y,” and “l.m.n” all belong to the sameVPN as network 32, traffic matching these DAs is sent via LP-1 66 a toother sites within the same VPN over the Diffserv-enabled IP VPN network44 while all other traffic is sent via LP-2 66 b to best effort IPpublic network 46.

The logical port 66 and LP queue to which packets are forwarded can bedetermined by static configuration or dynamically by a routing protocol.In either case, a VPN route should always have precedence over anInternet route if a CPE router 34 has both routes installed for the samedestination IP address. Such priority can be achieved in any of severalways, including (1) use of Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) (i.e., OSPFand IS-IS) to install VPN routes and EBGP or static routing to installInternet routes or (2) use of EBGP to install both VPN routes andInternet routes, with a higher local preference being given for VPNroutes.

After classification, packets are policed and marked, as appropriate, bypolicers P0, P1 and markers M0, M1, M2 as indicated by classifier table82 and then switched by forwarding function 62 to either logical port 66a or 66 b, as specified by the table lookup. Within the specifiedlogical port 66, packets are directed to the LP queues Q0-Q02 specifiedby classifier table 82. LP queues Q0-Q2 perform admission control basedupon either available buffer capacity or thresholds, such as RandomEarly Detection (RED). A scheduler 90 then services LP queues Q0-Q2according to a selected scheduling algorithm, such as First In, FirstOut (FIFO), Priority, Weighted Round Robin (WRR), Weighted Fair Queuing(WFQ) or Class-Based Queuing (CBQ). For example, in the illustratedembodiment, scheduler 90 of LP-2 66 a implements WFQ based upon theweight w_(i) associated with each LP queue i and the overall WFQscheduler rate r₂ for logical port 2, thereby shaping traffic to therate r₂. Finally, as noted above, scheduler 68 of physical WAN port 64services the various logical ports 66 to control the transmission rateto access network 38.

CPE edge router 34 receives packets from access network 38 at WANphysical port 64 and then, utilizing forwarding function 70, forwardspackets to the appropriate logical port 66 a or 66 b as indicated byconfiguration of access network 38 as it maps to the logical ports. Ateach logical port 66, packets pass through a classifier 100, whichgenerally employs one or more indices within the same set of indicesdiscussed above to access a classifier table 102. In a typicalimplementation, the lookup results of classifiers 100 are less complexthan those of classifier 80 because policing and marking areinfrequently required. Thus, in the depicted embodiment, packets areforwarded by forwarding function 62 directly from classifiers 100 oflogical ports 66 to the particular queues Q0-Q2 of LAN port 60 aspecified in the table lookup based upon the packets' DSCPs. Asdescribed above, queues Q0-Q2 of LAN port 60 a are serviced by ascheduler 102 that implements WFQ and transmits packets to customer LAN32.

Referring now to FIG. 6A, there is depicted a more detailed blockdiagram of a QoS-aware boundary router without any VPN function, whichmay be utilized within the network architecture of FIG. 4, for example,to implement boundary routers 42. As shown, boundary router 42 of FIG.6A includes a plurality of physical ports 116, a plurality of logicalports 110 coupled to access network 38 by a forwarding function 112 forincoming packets and a scheduler 114 for outgoing packets, and aforwarding function 118 that forwards packets between logical ports 110and physical ports 116. The implementation of multiple physical ports116 permits fault tolerant connection to network core routers, and theimplementation of multiple logical ports coupled to access network 38permits configuration of one logical port (i.e., LP-1 110 a) as aDiffserv-enabled logical port and a second logical port (i.e., LP-2 110b) as a best-effort logical port.

Thus, for traffic communicated from access network 38 through LP-2 110 bof boundary router 42 towards the network core, classifier 124 of LP-2110 b directs all packets to marker M0 in accordance with classifiertable 126. Marker M0 remarks all packets received at LP-2 110 b withDSCP 000, thus identifying the packets as best-effort traffic.Classifier 120 of LP-1 110 a, by contrast, utilizes classifier table 122to map incoming packets, which have already received DSCP marking at atrusted CPE (e.g., service provider-managed CPE edge router 34), intoqueues Q0-Q2 on PHY-1 116 a, which queues are each associated with adifferent level of QoS. Because the packets have already beenmulti-field classified, marked and shaped by the trusted CPE, boundaryrouter 42 need not remark the packets. If, however, the sending CPE edgerouter were not a trusted CPE, boundary router 42 would also need toremark and police packets received at LP-1 110 a.

Following classification (and marking in the case of traffic received atLP-2 110 b), traffic is forwarded to an appropriate physical port 116 orlogical port 110 by forwarding function 118. In contrast to edge router34 of FIG. 5, which utilizes classifiers to perform the full forwardinglookup, boundary router 42 employs an alternative design in whichforwarding function 118 accesses forwarding table 128 with a packet's DAto determine the output port, namely, LP-1 110 a, LP-2 110 b, or PHY-116a in this example. In the case of a non-VPN router, forwarding table 128is populated by generic IP routing protocols (e.g., Border GatewayProtocol (BGP)) or static configuration (e.g., association of the 24-bitIP address prefix “d.e.f.” with LP-2 110 b). An alternativeimplementation could centrally place the IP lookup forwarding functionin forwarding function 62. The exemplary implementation shown in FIG. 6assumes that boundary router 42 sends all traffic bound for the networkcore to only one of the physical ports 116 connected to a core router.In other embodiments, it is possible, of course, to load balance trafficacross physical ports 116. In addition, implementations omitting thecore router or employing one or more logical ports to one or more corerouters are straightforward extensions of the depicted design.

For traffic communicated to access network 38 through boundary router42, classifier 132 accesses classifier table 134 utilizing the DSCP ofthe packets to direct each packet to the appropriate one of queuesQ0-Q-2 for the QoS indicated by the packet's DSCP. For a customer thathas purchased a Diffserv-enabled logical port 110, this has the effectof delivering the desired QoS since the source CPE has policed andmarked the flow with appropriate DSCP value. Although a best-effortcustomer is capable of receiving higher quality traffic, preventing sucha one-way differentiated service would require significant additionalcomplexity in the classifier and include distribution of QoS informationvia routing protocols to every edge router in a service providernetwork.

With reference now to FIG. 6B, there is depicted a more detailed blockdiagram of a QoS-aware VPN boundary router 40, which may be utilized toprovide Diffserv-enabled and DoS-protected VPN service within thenetwork architecture depicted in FIG. 4. As shown, boundary router 40includes a plurality of physical ports 226 for connection to corerouters of Diffserv-enabled IP VPN network 44, a plurality ofDiffserv-enabled logical ports 224 coupled to an access network 38 by aforwarding function 220 for incoming packets and a scheduler 222 foroutgoing packets, and a forwarding function 228 that forwards packetsbetween logical ports 224 and physical ports 226.

Each Diffserv-enabled logical port 224 implemented on boundary router 40serves a respective one of a plurality of VPNs. For example,Diffserv-enabled logical port LP-A 224 a serves a customer sitebelonging to VPN A, which includes customer sites having the 24-bit IPaddress prefixes “a.b.c.” and “a.b.d.” Similarly, Diffserv-enabledlogical port LP-B 224 b serves a customer site belonging to VPN B, whichincludes two customer sites having the 24-bit IP address prefixes“b.c.d.” and “b.c.e.” Diffserv-enabled logical ports 224 do not servesites belonging to best effort IP public network 46 since such trafficis routed to boundary routers 42, as shown in FIG. 4.

As further illustrated in FIG. 6B, each core-facing physical port 226 ofboundary router 40 is logically partitioned into a plurality ofsub-interfaces implemented as logical tunnels 240. As will beappreciated by those skilled in the art, a tunnel may be implementedutilizing any of a variety of techniques, including an IP-over-IPtunnel, a Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnel, an IPsec operatedin tunnel mode, a set of stacked Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS)labels, a Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP), or a null tunnel. Suchtunnels can be distinguished from logical ports in that routinginformation for multiple VPNs can be associated with a tunnel in anested manner. For example, in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)/MPLSVPNs described in IETF RFC 2547, the topmost MPLS label determines thedestination boundary router while the bottommost label determines thedestination VPN.

In operation, a classifier 230 on each of Diffserv-enabled logical ports224 classifies packets flowing from access network 38 through boundaryrouter 40 to the network core of Diffserv-enabled IP VPN network 44 inaccordance with the packets' DSCP values by reference to a respectiveclassifier table 232. As depicted, classifier tables 232 a and 232 b areaccessed utilizing the DSCP as an index to determine the appropriate oneof queues Q0-Q2 on physical port PHY-1 226 a for each packet. Packetsreceived by physical ports 226 are similarly classified by a classifier250 by reference to a classifier table 254 to determine an appropriateone of queues Q0-Q2 for each packet on one of logical ports 224. Afterclassification (and optional (re)marking as shown at LP-B 224 b),forwarding function 228 switches packets between logical ports 224 andphysical ports 226 by reference to VPN forwarding tables 234 a-234 n,which are each associated with a respective VPN. Thus, for example, VPNforwarding table 234 a provides forwarding routes for VPN A, and VPNforwarding table 234 b provides forwarding routes for VPN B.

VPN forwarding tables 234 are accessed utilizing the source port and DAas indices. For example, in the exemplary network configurationrepresented in forwarding table 234 a, traffic within VPN A addressedwith a DA having a 24-bit IP address prefix of“a.b.d.” traverses TNL-1240 a, and traffic received at TNL-1 240 b is directed to LP-A 224 a.Similar routing between TNL-2 240 b and LP-B 224 b can be seen in VPNrouting table 234 b. As discussed above, VPN forwarding tables 234 canbe populated by static configuration or dynamically utilizing a routingprotocol.

Following processing by forwarding function 178, packets are eachdirected to the output port queue corresponding to their DSCP values.For example, packets marked with the QoS class associated with DSCP 101are placed in Q2, packets marked with the QoS class associated with DSCP010 are placed in Q1, and traffic marked with DSCP 000 is placed in Q0.Schedulers 236 and 252 then schedule output of packets from queues Q0-Q2to achieve the requested QoS.

With reference now to FIG. 7, there is illustrated an exemplary networkarchitecture 150 that provides a network-based VPN solution to the DoSattack problem. In FIG. 7, like reference numerals and traffic notationsare utilized to identify features corresponding to features of networkarchitecture 30 depicted in FIG. 4.

As depicted, network architecture 150 of FIG. 7, like networkarchitecture 30 of FIG. 4, includes a Diffserv-enabled IP VPN network44, a best effort IP public network 46, and a plurality of customerLocal Area Networks (LANs) 32. As above, customer LANs 32 a and 32 bbelong to the same VPN and each include one or more hosts 48 that canfunction as a transmitter and/or receiver of packets. Each customer LAN32 is coupled by a CPE edge router 34 and a physical access link 153 toa respective access network (e.g., an L2 or L3 access network) 154. Incontrast to access networks 38 of FIG. 4, which have separate logicalconnections for QoS and best effort traffic, access networks 154 areonly connected to boundary routers 156 of Diffserv-enabled IP VPNnetwork 44, which have separate logical connections to boundary routers42 of best effort IP public network 46. Thus, intra-VPN traffic destinedfor network 44 and extra-VPN traffic destined for network 46 are bothrouted through boundary routers 156, meaning that work-conservingscheduling between the two classes of traffic is advantageouslypermitted. However, as a consequence, the complexity of boundary routers156 necessarily increases because each boundary router 156 mustimplement a separate forwarding table for each attached customer, aswell as a full Internet forwarding table that can be shared amongcustomers.

Referring now to FIG. 8, there is depicted more detailed block diagramof a QoS-aware VPN boundary router in which the policers, shapers,schedulers, logical port access network connections and forwardingtables are configured to provide Diffserv-enabled and DoS-protected VPNservice within the network architecture depicted in FIG. 7. As shown,boundary router 156 includes a plurality of physical ports 176 forconnection to network core routers, a plurality of Diffserv-enabledlogical ports 174 coupled to access network 154 by a forwarding function170 for incoming packets and a scheduler 172 for outgoing packets, and aforwarding function 178 that forwards packets between logical ports 174and physical ports 176.

Because each CPE edge router 34 is coupled to a boundary router 156 byonly a single access link through access network 154, each networkcustomer site is served at boundary router 156 by a pair ofDiffserv-enabled logical ports 174, one for intra-VPN traffic and onefor extra-VPN traffic. For example, Diffserv-enabled logical ports LP-A1174 a and LP-A2 174 serve a single customer site belonging to VPN A,which includes at least two customer sites having the 24-bit IP addressprefixes “a.b.c.” and “a.b.d.” In the depicted embodiment, LP-A1 174 aprovides access to QoS traffic communicated across Diffserv-enabled IPVPN network 44 to and from sites belonging to VPN A, while LP-A2 174 bprovides access to best effort traffic to and from best effort IP publicnetwork 46.

As further illustrated in FIG. 8, each core-facing physical port 176 ofboundary router 156 is logically partitioned into a plurality ofsub-interfaces implemented as logical tunnels 180. As will beappreciated by those skilled in the art, a tunnel may be implementedutilizing any of a variety of techniques, including an IP-over-IPtunnel, a Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnel, an IPsec operatedin tunnel mode, a set of stacked Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS)labels, or a null tunnel. Such tunnels can be distinguished from logicalports in that routing information for multiple VPNs can be associatedwith a tunnel in a nested manner. For example, in the Border GatewayProtocol (BGP)/MPLS VPNs described in IETF RFC 2547, the topmost MPLSlabel determines the destination boundary router while the bottommostlabel determines the destination VPN.

In operation, a classifier 182 on each of Diffserv-enabled logical ports174 classifies packets flowing from access network 154 through boundaryrouter 156 to the network core in accordance with the packets' DSCPvalues by reference to a respective classifier table 190. As depicted,classifier tables 190 a and 190 b are accessed utilizing the DSCP as anindex to determine the appropriate one of queues Q0-Q2 on physical portPHY-1 176 a for each packet. Packets received by physical ports 176 aresimilarly classified by a classifier 198 by reference to a classifiertable 192 to determine an appropriate one of queues Q0-Q2 for eachpacket on one of logical ports 174. After classification (and optional(re)marking as shown at LP-A2 174 b), forwarding function 178 switchespackets between logical ports 174 and physical ports 176 by reference toVPN forwarding tables 194 a-194 n, which are each associated with arespective VPN and shared Internet forwarding table 195. Thus, forexample, forwarding table 194 a contains entries providing forwardingroutes for VPN A, while Internet forwarding table 195 contains entriesproviding forwarding routes for packets specifying LP-A2 or TNL-2 (i.e.,the logical interfaces configured for Internet access) as a source.

Forwarding tables 194 are accessed utilizing the source port and DA asindices. For example, in the exemplary network configuration representedin forwarding table 194 a, intra-VPN traffic addressed with a DA havinga 24-bit IP address prefix of “a.b.d.” traverses TNL-1 180 a, whileextra-VPN (i.e., Internet) traffic traverses TNL-2 180 b (which could bea null tunnel). Forwarding table 194 a further indicates that intra-VPNtraffic received via TNL-1 180 a is directed to LP-A1 174 a, and allother traffic arriving from the Internet via tunnel TNL-2 180 baddressed with a DA having a 24-bit IP address prefix of“a.b.c.” is sentto LP-A2 174 b. Traffic that terminates to other ports on boundaryrouter 156 (i.e., traffic having a Local DA) is sent to other ports ofboundary router 156 (indicated as LP-x). In other words, the entries inforwarding table 194 a marked “Local” specify address prefixes otherthan those assigned to VPNs (e.g., a.b.c/24) that are assigned tointerfaces on boundary router 156.

Following processing by forwarding function 178, packets are eachdirected to the output port queue corresponding to their DSCP values.For example, packets marked with the QoS class associated with DSCP 101are placed in Q2, packets marked with the QoS class associated with DSCP010 are placed in Q1, and best effort traffic marked with DSCP 000 isplaced in Q0. Schedulers 196 then schedule output of packets from queuesQ0-Q2 to achieve the requested QoS.

As has been described, the present invention provides an improvednetwork architecture for providing QoS to intra-VPN traffic whileprotecting such flows against DoS attack from sources outside the VPN.The present invention provides DoS-protected QoS to selected flowsutilizing a network-based VPN service and a best effort Internet serviceconnected to a CPE edge router using a L2 access network withappropriately configured routing protocols. Diffserv marking at the edgeand handling in the network-based VPN core provides QoS to selectedflows while logically partitioning intra-VPN and extra-VPN traffic toprevent DoS to a VPN network customer site due to traffic originatingfrom outside of the customer's VPN exceeding that site's accesscapacity. Even further protection from traffic originating from withinthe customer's VPN is possible using Intserv policy control, implementedon the CPE edge router and/or the QoS-aware boundary router, asdescribed in IETF RFC 2998, incorporated herein by reference.

The network architecture of the present invention may be realized inCPE-based and network-based implementations. The CPE-basedimplementation permits easy configuration of the access networks linkingthe CPE edge routers and service provider boundary routers and permitsQoS to be offered to VPN sites without implementing Diffserv across theentire service provider network. The network-based configurationadvantageously permits work conserving scheduling that permits extra-VPNtraffic to utilize excess access capacity allocated to intra-VPNtraffic.

While various embodiments of the present invention have been describedabove, it should be understood that they have been presented by way ofexample only, and not limitation. Thus, the breadth and scope of thepresent invention should not be limited by any of the above-describedexemplary embodiments, but should be defined only in accordance with thefollowing claims and their equivalents. For example, although thepresent invention has been described with respect to preferredembodiments in which network-based VPNs are implemented within aDiffserv network, it should be understood that the present invention isnot restricted to use with Diffserv networks, but is instead to othernetwork-based VPNs, which may be implemented, for example, utilizingBGP/MPLS as taught in RFC 2547 or virtual routers as taught in RFC 2917.In addition, although FIGS. 3, 4 and 7 illustrate the connection of eachCPE edge router to a VPN network and a best effort network by one accesslink, it should be understood that, for redundancy, a CPE edge routermay be connected by multiple access links to one or more accessnetworks, which provide logical connections to one or more boundaryrouters of each of the VPN and best effort networks. In such “dualhoming” implementations, the multiple access links can be utilized ineither a primary/backup or load-sharing arrangement through installationof static routes in the service provider boundary routers or dynamicconfiguration of the service provider boundary routers utilizing routingprotocols (e.g., EBGP). This would require that the CPE edge routerimplement multiple forwarding tables and separate instances of therouting protocol for the VPN and Internet access address spaces. Theimplementation of such a CPE edge router would be similar to thatillustrated in FIG. 8 and described in the associated text, with only asingle VPN table and a single table for Internet routes.

1. A method for supporting a virtual private network (VPN), the methodcomprising: designating a first port of a router for packets transmittedinternal to the VPN, the first port corresponding to a communicationlink; designating a second port of the router for packets transmittedexternal to the VPN, the second port corresponding to the communicationlink; determining whether a received packet is internal to the VPN;transmitting the received packet over the first port if the receivedpacket is determined to be internal to the VPN; and preventing aDenial-of-Service (DoS) attack with respect to the communication link byallocating capacity on the communication link to ensure a predeterminedQuality of Service (QoS) level for transmission of the packets internalto the VPN.
 2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the router is aboundary router in communication with a customer premise router over thecommunication link.
 3. A method according to claim 1, wherein thereceived packet includes a Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP)field, the method further comprising: setting the DifferentiatedServices Code Point (DSCP) field according to one of a plurality ofQuality of Service (QoS) levels.
 4. A method according to claim 1,wherein the packets external to the VPN correspond to another VPN.
 5. Amethod according to claim 1, the method further comprising:communicating with a first boundary router coupled to the VPN.
 6. Amethod according to claim 5, the method further comprising:communicating with a second boundary router coupled to a public datanetwork.
 7. A routing device for supporting a virtual private network(VPN), the device comprising: a first port designated for packetstransmitted internal to the VPN; a second port designated for packetstransmitted external to the VPN, wherein the first port and the secondport couples to a communication link; and a classifier configured todetermine whether a received packet is internal to the VPN, wherein thereceived packet is transmitted over the first port if the receivedpacket is determined to be internal to the VPN, wherein aDenial-of-Service (DoS) attack with respect to the communication link isprevented by allocating capacity on the communication link to ensure apredetermined Quality of Service (QoS) level for transmission of thepackets internal to the VPN.
 8. A device according to claim 7, whereinthe routing device is a boundary router.
 9. A device according to claim7, wherein the received packet includes a Differentiated Services CodePoint (DSCP) field that is set according to one of a plurality ofQuality of Service (QoS) levels.
 10. A device according to claim 7,wherein the received packet is forwarded over the communication link toa customer premise equipment (CPE) router.
 11. A device according toclaim 7, wherein the packets external to the VPN correspond to anotherVPN.
 12. A device according to claim 7, the device further comprising: athird port configured to communicate with a first boundary routercoupled to the VPN.
 13. A device according to claim 12, the devicefurther comprising: a fourth port configured to communicate with asecond boundary router coupled to a public data network.
 14. A devicefor supporting a virtual private network (VPN), the device comprising: afirst network port configured to receive a packet from a host; and asecond network port coupled to a communication link for transporting thepacket to a boundary router that interfaces the VPN, wherein theboundary router has a first communication port designated for packetstransmitted internal to the VPN and a second communication port forpackets transmitted external to the VPN, the first communication portand the second communication port being configured to couple to thecommunication link, wherein the boundary router prevents aDenial-of-Service (DoS) attack with respect to the communication link byallocating capacity on the communication link to ensure a predeterminedQuality of Service (QoS) level for transmission of the packets internalto the VPN.
 15. A device according to claim 14, wherein the device is acustomer premise equipment (CPE) router.
 16. A device according to claim14, further comprising: a third network port configured to communicatewith another boundary router coupled to a public data network.